If this article sounds like a hard-hitting message, then it’s meant to be. With our full blessing, the MAIB selected PBR to publish a specially written article on the dangers related to the operation of commercial passenger/experience rides. It makes for sobering reading, but the principles and lessons apply to us all …
When you are trying to promote the fun element of an activity, also telling your customers that it can be hazardous might appear counterproductive. This could explain the reluctance of the ‘small-craft passenger/experience ride’ industry to acknowledge and act on the findings from recent accident investigations. However, until the lessons are acknowledged, and appropriate actions taken, passengers will continue to suffer life-changing injuries and possibly death, as the Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) report into the RIB Seadogz accident illustrates. If this sounds like a hard-hitting message, it is meant to be.
Early warnings: ‘Houston, we have a problem’
The MAIB has investigated numerous accidents involving RIBs, some of which are referred to in this article. While the early investigations focused on the usual crop of collisions and groundings, it was not until the enquiry into the heavy landing of the RIB Celtic Pioneer in 2008 that passenger vulnerability to injury came into focus. That investigation report drew on recent academic and practical research to highlight the importance of good seating, posture and handholds to help mitigate against spinal injuries. The particularly vulnerable part of the spine was found to be the lower lumbar region (L1 to L3) (Fig.1), which could suffer wedge compression fractures, but other spinal injuries were not uncommon.
Fortunately, passengers suffering less damaging injuries often walked off the RIB with a sore back, but if the pain persisted they would see their doctor a few days later, and by then, the link between the injury mechanism (the RIB ride) and the injury had been lost. Consequently, the MAIB was only aware of those accidents where the emergency services were called to extract the injured party. This resulted in a skewed picture of the actual injury rate. Nonetheless, there were still sufficient accidents being reported for the branch to warn heavily against the consequences of poor posture and inadequate seating. (Fig.2,3 and 4)
Unfortunately, the messages were not getting through, and a short while later, a person travelling to work on the River Thames suffered a very serious back injury when the RIB they were travelling on crossed the wake of another vessel at about 30 knots. The worker was sitting on top of a locker with no padding or handholds and had their rucksack across their chest. (Fig. 5) The combination of the hard seat and poor posture resulted in the victim suffering anterior wedge fractures of the first and third lumbar vertebrae (L1 and L3). They were fitted with an external body brace in hospital and remained off work for more than four months while recovering, but they were still receiving physiotherapy treatment eight months after the accident.
In response to the MAIB’s recommendations, the industry produced two voluntary codes of practice for RIB operators, but initial take-up was patchy.
The hazard of side impact
The collision between Osprey and Osprey II (Fig. 6) which left a passenger with life-changing injuries, highlighted how vulnerable passengers in small boats are to side impact injuries.
Accidents involving small race boats have shown how easily one boat hitting another side-on can ride up and over it, and that the passengers in the receiving boat have little or no protection. RIBs are particularly vulnerable as the shape of the tubes helps lift the bow of the colliding boat so it crosses the seating area, and any passengers seated on the tubes can take the full force of the impact. Not only is it impossible to maintain a good posture when seated on a tube, but the added risks from side impact are considered too high and the MAIB recommends that when the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) updates the small commercial craft codes it includes a requirement that every passenger in a commercially operated passenger-carrying RIB has a suitable seat.
The Osprey RIBs accident also highlighted the hazards of fast/high-speed craft operating close to each other, where, unless their manoeuvres are well coordinated, the risk of collision can be high. Although the two RIBs in question usually passed each other during a scheduled high-speed turn, on the day of the accident their start positions were reversed. As the RIBs approached each other head-on, the skippers were confused as to whether they should pass ‘as normal’ or follow the COLREGs and each alter to starboard. Although both skippers reduced speed, the RIBs collided, crushing a passenger against the console. Had the risk of collision during the turn been considered before the trip, risk mitigation measures could have been planned.
Head-on impact: RIB Seadogz
On 22nd August 2020, the commercially operated RIB Seadogz hit a navigation buoy at high speed in Southampton Water. (Fig. 7 see page 122) The skipper and the 11 passengers suffered impact injuries; two passengers were thrown into the water, and 15-year-old Emily Lewis, who was sitting in the middle of the bench seat, sustained fatal injuries. The MAIB’s investigation concluded that the skipper did not see the buoy in sufficient time to avoid it as he had lost positional awareness, most likely due to the high mental workload of operating the RIB alone and at high speed. Further: the seating and handholds on the RIB afforded little protection to the passengers during rapid deceleration; the operator’s safety management procedures were cursory and generic; and the current regulations for such operations needed updating.
Other safety issues were also identified. Two of the passengers were ejected into the water, one of whom started to panic as their life jacket rode up on inflation as it had not been fitted properly. From the helm position, the bow-up trim of the RIB and the passengers’ heads combined to limit the skipper’s forward visibility. Most worryingly, the conduct of the trip fell short of ‘good practice’ in many ways: the tight figure-of-eight turns carried out at speed introduced the risk of a ‘hook’; the RIB was being jumped over wakes; and the frequent close passes to the large navigation buoys desensitised the passengers to the risk of collision. When Seadogz was heading directly towards the North-West Netley lateral buoy, it is likely that most of the passengers expected the RIB to turn away at the last minute. When that did not happen, it was too late to warn the skipper of the impending collision.
In response to the accident, the Royal Yachting Association (RYA) has started to update the ‘Passenger Safety on Commercial High Speed Craft and Experience Rides – a Voluntary Code of Practice’, and the MAIB has, once again, made a number of recommendations. The investigation report recommended that the MCA introduce updated guidance (the ‘Sport and Pleasure Vessel Code’) as soon as possible. However, noting the risks to passengers from vertical and side impacts already identified in previous investigations, the MAIB also recommended that the MCA carry out a full anthropometric assessment of the risks to passengers travelling in small high-speed craft, the results of which should be reflected in the new Code as soon as possible. It was also recommended that the port and harbour associations provide guidance to harbour authorities on how they should oversee the activities of small commercial craft operating in harbour areas.
So what now?
The initial feedback is that many operators seem to be distancing themselves from the Seadogz accident by saying that the lessons do not apply to their operation: ‘Sea safaris and wildlife sightseeing trips are not high-speed/thrill rides, so we can carry on as normal.’ Too much focus may have been put on ‘high speed’, but the reality is that passengers in RIBs can suffer horrific injuries even at slow speeds. The collision between Osprey and Osprey II occurred at relatively slow speed, but these large RIBs each weighed several tonnes, so the crushing force was significant. And last summer, a passenger on a sea safari RIB suffered life-changing spinal injuries when the RIB, travelling at quite slow speed, fell off a wave into a deep trough.
Time will tell whether the public will shun RIB rides this year as a result of the Seadogz accident, but we can be certain that those taking trips do not expect to spend the rest of their life in a wheelchair because of an injury sustained during the trip. Good practice is being taught during RYA training, and there is plenty of guidance available in the ‘Commercial High Speed Craft and Experience Rides Code’ and on the RYA’s website. However, it is worth reiterating a few key points:
Operating procedures.
Operators should be clear about the sort of trips they are offering, assess the hazards and ensure that suitable mitigating measures are in place. If the mitigations cannot be delivered, then the trip should not be offered. Particular attention should be paid to feedback: if someone has been injured in the past, the trip/route should be adjusted to prevent it happening again. Further, all helms should be briefed on what they should be doing and what is off limits. If, for example, the RIB’s seating does not provide shock mitigation, then strict speed and sea state limits need to be set and adhered to. If the trip involves high-speed manoeuvres, is a second crewmember required to help keep a lookout and an eye on passenger safety while the skipper is concentrating on helming?
Pre-departure briefing.
There is a lot to fit in to a good pre-departure briefing besides telling the passengers what they are about to experience: life jacket operation must be explained and their fit checked; passengers need to know how to sit correctly, brace themselves and hold on; each passenger must be allocated to a seat suitable for them, and checks must be made to ensure their feet can gain firm purchase on the floor, their backs can rest on the back support and they can grip the handholds correctly. Finally, the means of signalling concern or a problem needs to be both understood and achievable. Passengers are unlikely to raise their hands if they are clinging on for dear life. All this takes time, so scheduling must allow for it, or other staff should be used. Carrying out the briefing while walking to the boat or donning life jackets while underway might save time, but it will not save lives.
Conduct of the trip itself.
The trip should always be operated in line with the offering made. If passengers have booked on a wildlife sea safari ride, they might not expect to be subjected to a thrill ride involving tightly banked turns at speed or wave and wake jumping. Even thrill-seeking passengers might find manoeuvring at 25 to 30 knots exciting, so operating at 40 to 50 knots could stray into a terrifying experience. It is worth remembering that skippers can easily become insulated from the experience on offer. If the RIB has an aft helm position, the motion experienced by the crew will be much softer than that affecting passengers near the bow. The skipper is looking ahead and helming so they can anticipate the boat’s motion, they are experienced at bracing themselves and, of course, they have done the trip multiple times before. A passenger RIB ride is not the time to start exploring the operating limits of their boat: whatever the experience on offer, the skipper’s prime concern must be to return their passengers safely ashore uninjured.
So is that it? Should we shut up shop?
Absolutely not. RIB rides are accessible and fun when conducted well, and there is a strong market for them. However, while the ‘Sport and Pleasure Vessel Code’ is coming and the ‘Passenger Safety on Commercial High Speed Craft and Experience Rides – a Voluntary Code of Practice’ is being updated, there is no need to wait for these before improvements are made. If the sector’s reputation is to survive accidents like that which occurred to Seadogz, owners and operators need to start employing best practice, controlling the risks and demonstrating that their trips are safe.
MAIB REPORT (Fig 1-4) – Heavy landing onboard Celtic Pioneer RIB resulting in one person injured.
MAIB REPORT (Fig 5) – Heavy landing onboard a Delta RIB with one person injured.